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Diabolical Mysticism, Death, and Skepticism
 
 Eli Hirsch
 One theory has it that dying is bad for the one who dies.  “A bad end is in 
store for us all,” according to Thomas Nagel’s formulation in “Death”.1  The 
theoretical price exacted by this position is to explain why and when the decedent 
suffers from being deceased. That cost seems too steep to some thinkers who 
therefore defend a second theory that holds that death is not bad for the one 
who dies, though it may of course be bad for those left behind.  A famous ancient 
expression of the second position comes from Epicurus: “So long as we exist 
death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist.”2
 These two positions have been the main ones considered in analytic 
philosophy. A perspective they share is that “death is part of life,” at least in the 
sense that one’s death is something one can think about in the same way one 
thinks about other problems. For Nagel my death is bad for me because of all of 
the potentially good things I will lose by not continuing to live. It was bad for me 
that I missed out on going to a high school prom, and when I die I will miss out 
on many more things. My death is much worse than missing the prom, perhaps 
in some sense infinitely worse, but we are dealing here with the same intelligible 
dimension of badness. For Epicurus, on the other hand, my missing the prom 
was bad for me because I was there to suffer that loss, whereas my death can’t 
be bad for me because I won’t be there to suffer the loss of everything I can no 
longer have. Two ordinary philosophical theories, argued out in the standard 
ways, are on the table.3
 There is, however, a third radically different kind of perspective, which I 
will try to explain by adapting a notion from William James’s The Varieties of 
Religious Experience.  On this perspective the contemplation of one’s death elicits 
a peculiar experience of the sort James called  “diabolical mysticism.”4  A mystical 
experience, as James understands it, has two essential characteristics: it purports to 
be revelatory of some truth, and that truth is ineffable. In the case of a diabolical 
mystical experience the truth that seems to be revealed is ineffably horrible. My 
death does not strike me as bad in anything like the way Nagel tries to depict. It 
is “bad” in some other way, in a way that can’t be put into words.
 To qualify as a diabolical visionary it does not suffice that you have experienced 
some transcendent horror. The key thing is that you must view that horror as 
ineffable.  Ineffability is not, however, a simple matter. Probably it is best viewed 
as admitting of degrees and as being relative to the representational resources at 
one’s disposal. Mystics, whether of the more familiar religious kind or the diabolical 
kind, can’t say it but can try to whistle it. James actually held that “music gives 
us ontological messages which non-musical criticism is unable to contradict”5; 
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that seems extreme even for mystics, but it’s not the kind of whistling I’m talking 
about. Mystics, as well as poets and other literati, will often implicitly reject F.P. 
Ramsey’s law that “if you can’t say it, you can’t whistle it either.” Religious mystics 
are found in the literature to go on prolifically in talking about their experience 
of God and oneness, while at the same time insisting that, as St. Theresa put it, 
“if our understanding comprehends, it is in a mode which remains unknown 
to it, and it can understand nothing of what it comprehends.”6 It may be that 
the strain of diabolical mysticism, at least amongst the sane, is more likely to 
get expressed in literature—in poetry, plays, and novels—than in philosophical 
formulations. In both the religious and the diabolical cases the philosophical 
formulations cannot be taken quite literally, but they also differ from more ordinary 
metaphorical talk. They differ in both being further and more problematically 
removed from the literal and in being elicited by a definite experience or mental 
state. If I say, “Norman Mailer was a professional prize fighter” this metaphorical 
utterance is probably not elicited by any specific experience, and, though it can’t 
be straightforwardly paraphrased in literal terms, a good approximation to what 
is intended can be literally rendered.7  But if, when I contemplate my death, I 
utter “Nothing in life makes any sense”, this utterance is elicited by something I 
experience that I can’t begin to render in literal terms. I seem to be comparing life 
to a nonsensical statement, but I can’t begin to say literally what that comparison 
amounts to.
 This last utterance is something that diabolical mystics will almost always 
make.  It corresponds to the religious mystic’s ubiquitous utterances about the 
universe’s transcendent unity and harmony. James cites Boehme’s remark that 
Primal Love as revealed by his (religious) mystical experience is something “which 
a man cannot express or utter what it is, there being nothing to which it may 
be compared.”8  What Boehme says about Primal Love the diabolical mystic 
may say about life’s senselessness. Boehme’s remark, even more perhaps than 
the remark quoted from St. Theresa, seems to suggest that the truth revealed by 
mystical experience is somehow in principle inaccessible to conceptualization. I 
will not try to delve into this. I’m appealing here to a rough intuitive sense of the 
distinction between literal and non-literal discourse, and to the idea of a kind 
of experience that purports to reveal a truth that cannot be expressed in literal 
discourse. I make no pretense of being able to go deeper than that into what 
ineffability and mysticism amount to.
 I don’t think that the word “supernatural” has an unambiguous meaning, 
but the pictures associated with it—angels, demons, God in heaven—have no 
bearing on what I am talking about. The diabolical mystical experience purports 
to reveal something about our lives, something about our situation as human 
beings. The revelation is purely “immanent” (it supervenes on plain facts about 
our lives).  The expression “diabolical poetic vision” might be in some ways less 
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misleading, but it does not convey the immediacy and impact of the experience 
I am talking about.
 In Sartre’s story “The Wall” we have a literary incarnation of the diabolical 
mystic’s revelation in the face of death.9  Two characters, Tom and Pablo, are 
waiting to be executed the following morning. Tom says: “Something is going to 
happen to us that I can’t understand. … It’s like a nightmare. You want to think 
something, you always have the impression that it’s all right, that you’re going 
to understand and then it slips, it escapes you and fades away. I tell myself there 
will be nothing afterwards. But I don’t understand what it means. … I’ve got to 
think … think that I won’t see anything anymore and the world will go on for 
the others. We aren’t made to think that, Pablo.” Listening to this Pablo agrees. 
“I could have said everything he said,” he thinks. “It isn’t natural to die.” And 
later he thinks, “I didn’t want to think any more about what would happen at 
dawn, at death. It made no sense. I only found words or emptiness.”
 What are these characters talking about? Not natural to die? Your heart stops, 
blood stops going to your brain, blah, blah. Why is that not natural? What is 
it that Tom and Pablo have a problem understanding? First I exist, then I don’t. 
What can be simpler than that? Attempts in some literature to elucidate this 
problem by appealing either to logical-metaphysical puzzles about existence, or 
to our inability to imagine (coherently) how things will be for us when we no 
longer exist, are immediately shown to be off the mark by considering that Tom 
and Pablo have no problem understanding what it means for them to have not 
existed before they were born. Why is it a greater problem for them to understand 
what it means for them to not exist after they die?10
 We have to see this a bit differently. “I can’t understand that I am going to 
die” means “There is something about the fact that I am going to die that I grasp 
in some way but that I can’t understand in literalistic conceptual or linguistic 
terms.” That I’m an entity that exists up to a certain time and then stops existing 
seems simple enough. But when I try to face that fact there is something else 
that comes along with it that I can’t understand in ordinary terms, something 
that propels me outside of my natural conceptual and emotional framework 
and leaves me with nothing but “words or emptiness.” That truth that I can’t 
understand in literalistic terms I do nevertheless grasp to be horrible in some 
indescribable way and to undermine everything that I have ever cared about 
in my life. “Nothing makes any sense, nothing is real, nothing matters”: those 
are the root metaphorical-mystical utterances delivered by the diabolical vision. 
Hence Pablo eventually thinks: “If someone had come and told me I could go 
home quietly, that they would leave my life whole, it would have left me cold: 
several hours or several years of waiting is all the same when you have lost the 
illusion of being eternal.”
 Pablo’s thoughts about the senselessness of life should be contrasted with 
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Thomas Nagel’s thoughts in his paper “The Absurd”.11  Nagel cannot see any 
definite connection between death and the sense of life’s absurdity, and he 
winds up giving an account that, from the perspective of the diabolical vision, 
may seem somewhat shallow and wrongly focused. He suggests that our sense of 
life’s absurdity stems from our viewing ourselves sub specie aeternitatis, and from 
that perspective we find our natural energetic and often frenetic comings and 
goings ridiculous. But, if I am like Pablo and the thought of my death makes me 
want to utter “Nothing makes any sense,” I am not outside looking in, but inside 
looking out. This utterance seems to arise from the center of my life, not from a 
remote philosophical outpost where I sit and spy on my life like an ungenerous 
film critic finding it to be a comedy when it was advertised as a drama. The 
centrifugal force pushing me outside of my ordinary perspective is the force of 
a revelation, but a revelation whose content I cannot explain in literal language. 
Whereas Nagel’s absurdism from afar (“from nowhere”) need scarcely threaten 
the inner motives that normally drive our lives, Pablo’s vision of senselessness, 
arising from the center of his life, threatens even his most basic cares and reasons 
of love.12
 There is a significant and well-known body of literature debating the epistemic 
authority of mystical experience to reveal any truth about the world. I will not 
touch on this topic except to remark that there is no obvious reason why the 
diabolical kind should be accorded a lesser epistemic standing than the religious 
kind. Religious mystics will often say outright that they cannot explain themselves 
in literalistic language. The cited remarks to this effect by St. Theresa and Boehme 
are typical. Such explicit disavowals of literalistic language seem less common 
amongst the diabolical mystics. This may be because they fear that their audience 
will be tempted to dismiss their “ineffable visions” as mere lunacy.13  Of course the 
religious mystics are hardly invulnerable to this reaction, but people are naturally 
more patient with mystification in the service of glorifying life than mystification 
in the service of undermining it. Since the diabolical mystics generally do not 
declare themselves as such it is sometimes difficult to tell whether we are dealing 
with a philosopher’s attempt to convey a diabolical vision in metaphorical-mystical 
terms or dealing simply with philosophical confusion and perversity.
 This point affects the overall assessment of Paul Edwards’s brilliant 
demolition job in Heidegger on Death: A Critical Evaluation.14  I should say 
immediately that I consider it hopeless to try to defend Heidegger’s twisted 
verbiage and incomprehensible arguments.  But there are certain central famous 
pronouncements he made that may resonate within us as expressing poetically 
or metaphorically truths that cannot be expressed otherwise.15
 Here are two very famous Heideggerian pronouncements on death:
 (1) All human beings die alone.16
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 (2)  When we face death we experience a special kind of Angst (anxiety) in 
which we confront the Nothing.17
 Edwards demonstrates that there is no remotely ordinary sense in which 
(1) is true.  People often die in the presence of other people who are not dying 
and sometimes together with other people who are dying. It is not even true 
that people always feel alone when they die; Edward informs us that Hume, for 
example, “never felt closer to his friends than during this period [when he was 
facing death]” (Heidegger and Death, p. 8).  As regards (2) Edwards agrees that there 
seems to be a special kind of “mood that comes over thoughtful people when 
they fully realize the finality of death,” and this mood is by no means “stupid” 
(Heidegger and Death, p.58), but there is no reason to think that this mood reveals 
some extraordinary fact about some item called “the Nothing.”
 In the course of Pablo’s ruminations about death in “The Wall” he thinks 
about his lover Concha: “Now I had no more desire to see her, I had nothing 
more to say to her. … I thought of her soft beautiful eyes. … But I knew it was 
over: if she looked at me now the look would stay in her eyes, it wouldn’t reach 
me.  I was alone.” Given that Pablo found only “words or emptiness” in the face 
of death it seems not surprising that he has lost the basis to relate to another 
person. In that sense he certainly is alone, phenomenologically alone, locked 
indeed in a kind of unfathomable solitude. But Hume was different, according 
to Edwards. Is this because Hume did not experience that special kind of “mood” 
that Edwards says comes over thoughtful people when they fully realize the finality 
of death? Or is it that one can experience that “mood” and still feel close to one’s 
friends?
 What is the “mood” that Edwards is talking about? He says that he does 
not think that “the words ‘fear’ or ‘anxiety’ or any other term taken from the 
fear-family are appropriate names for the mood.” But a few sentences later he 
seems to try to explain this special “mood” by saying that “it is difficult to bear 
the thought that, after I have died, I will be unable—for all eternity—to do any of 
the things that made life interesting and enjoyable … .” That sounds like Nagel’s 
explanation of why we all come to a bad end. But that doesn’t seem to explain 
the special “mood” we experience when we try to face that bad end. It is often 
said that the worst thing that can happen to a person is the death of one’s child. 
If I were faced with a situation in which I had to choose between my own death 
and the death of my child, I am quite certain I would choose the former. In that 
sense the thought of my child’s death is for me more “difficult to bear” than the 
thought of my own death. But it is only the latter that is likely to elicit the special 
“mood” that Edwards talks about.18
 Edwards, it appears, does not explain the nature of the special “mood” or why 
we have it. And there is a further difficulty. Edwards implies that it is required of 
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thoughtful people to experience this “mood”. Why is this? Indeed, if the “mood” 
is as painful as Edwards says it is, why isn’t it “stupid” to experience it?
 It seems to me that Edwards comes close to something that he then wants 
to brush aside. There seems to be only one relevant requirement on thoughtful 
people and that is to not evade the truth they are faced with. The “mood” 
Edwards is talking about is implicitly conceived by him as being representational, 
as purporting to reveal some truth that it is hard to face. Is this not the ineffably 
horrible truth Pablo tried to face and that cut him off from other people? If so, 
thoughtful people cannot die the way Hume reportedly did. This, at any rate, 
is Hedegger’s position, and it seems to me that Edwards comes very close to 
embracing it.
 Let’s suppose that “Angst” is Heidegger’s name for the mental state of facing 
that truth. Angst is the diabolical mystical experience in the face of death. In 
the grip of Angst there can be only “words or emptiness.” We have no way to 
conceptualize what the truth is that Angst reveals. A poetic shorthand for it might 
be “the Nothing” (or “the Abyss”). Heidegger’s (1) and (2) may therefore not be 
quite as bad as Edwards makes out.19
 From the diabolical perspective death and solipsism go together. There is 
the idea just discussed that in the face of death one experiences a special kind 
of feeling of being alone. But there is another connection that I want to discuss.
 By the possibility of radical deception I mean the metaphysical (and perhaps 
physical) possibility of there being a situation in which I am phenomenologically 
just as I have been throughout my life but I am completely deluded about 
everything that matters to me. My being a brain in a vat is one familiar example 
of such a possible situation. Many people who reflect seriously on the possibility 
of radical deception find themselves distressed in a certain way. I will call this 
form of distress epistemic uneasiness. I have in mind the sort of distress Hume 
famously described as the “philosophical melancholy and delirium” that he could 
only escape by not thinking about philosophy.20  I want to try to understand 
what the nature is of this epistemic uneasiness. What I want to suggest is that 
there is an analogy to be drawn between the way the diabolical vision relates to 
the thought of death and the way epistemic uneasiness relates to the thought of 
the possibility of radical deception.21
 This analogy will be immediately dismissed by those philosophers who either 
deny that there is the possibility of radical deception or who deny that there is 
any epistemic uneasiness elicited by reflecting on that possibility. Putnam is the 
most prominent representative of the first denial.22  It seems to me that there are 
a number of things wrong with Putnam’s position, but I will not be able to argue 
for this here.23  I am simply going to assume that there is the possibility of radical 
deception. (As a solution to the problem of skepticism Putnam’s proposal strikes 
me as akin to trying to solve the problem of death by proving the immortality of 
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the soul.)
 Many more philosophers, while granting the possibility of radical deception, 
will deny that reflecting on this possibility need elicit any form of epistemic 
uneasiness. Why, they will ask, should it? One of G.E. Moore’s important 
achievements in epistemology was to clearly distinguish between two senses of 
saying, “It’s possible that I’m completely deceived.”24  In one sense this means 
that it is metaphysically (or physically) possible for me to be deceived; this is what 
I have called the possibility of radical deception. In a second sense it means that 
I may actually be deceived, where this implies that I have reason to worry that 
I am deceived. Asserting the sentence in the first sense does not by any means 
require me to assert it in the second sense. And if I do not assert it in the second 
sense then I have no reason to feel at all distressed.
 Despite this correct and pertinent distinction it seems that when thoughtful 
people reflect seriously on the possibility of radical deception they often do feel 
a peculiar kind of epistemic uneasiness, and that they continue to feel this even 
after they have fully understood Moore’s distinction.
 Suppose we agree for the moment that there is the possibility of radical 
deception, and also that reflecting on this possibility may elicit epistemic 
uneasiness. The suggested analogy to the case of death may still seem completely 
farfetched. On the diabolical perspective under consideration the idea was that 
our reaction to facing the fact of our death brings in something ineffable and 
mysterious. But, it will be said, there is nothing ineffable or mysterious in our 
reaction to facing the possibility of radical deception. The epistemic uneasiness 
that we experience is simply a matter of our having doubts, of our feeling that we 
may actually be deceived. Don’t we indeed have a well-known model of this in 
the case of Hume? Wasn’t his “philosophical melancholy and delirium” derived 
from his doubts? There seems to be nothing ineffable or mysterious about this.
 I do not question that Hume experienced the distress he describes. But I do 
not think that it came from doubt. I think, indeed, that it is not possible for a 
sane human being to doubt that he is living a human life and is not completely 
deceived.
 Many philosophers have held that skeptical reflections can never lead to 
genuinely doubting the existence of an external world. At the end of the Synopsis 
of the Meditations Descartes says that the fact “that there is a world, that men 
have bodies, and other similar things … have never been doubted by any man of 
sound mind.”25  I assume that philosophers are in the relevant sense people of 
sound mind, even during those periods when they philosophize. If Descartes was 
right, Hume never doubted external reality. G.E. Moore suggests that even great 
skeptics like Russell “have constantly felt no doubt at all” about the propositions 
of which they professed skepticism.26  More recently Peter Strawson says that 
“whatever arguments may be produced on one side or the other of the question 
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[about external reality], we simply cannot help believing in the existence of body.”27 
And Hume himself seemed to agree with this, at least at times. His somewhat 
meandering discussion of skepticism towards the end of Book I of the Treatise 
is not always easy to follow, but there are passages where he seems clear that his 
philosophizing cannot possibly lead him to radical doubt. He says: “[Nature] has 
sometimes such an influence [in making us believe in an external reality] … that 
‘tis impossible ever to eradicate it, nor will any strained metaphysical conviction 
…. be sufficient for that purpose.”28
 I will assume, without pursuing this point further here (though of course it 
does need further defense), that philosophizing did not lead Hume, and cannot 
lead anyone, to sincerely doubt external reality.29  If that is so, what caused Hume’s 
distress? If philosophical reflection does not lead to doubt, why should it lead to 
epistemic uneasiness?
 Let me say that a “mystical skeptic” is someone who holds the following three 
things:
 (1)  I do not have any doubts whatsoever that there is an external world 
containing the people and events that matter the most to me.
 (2)  Nevertheless, when I reflect on the possibility of radical deception I 
seem to become aware of something that makes me feel a peculiar form 
of uneasiness, a peculiar form of  disorientation and anxiety.
 (3)  I cannot express in plain literal language what it is that I become aware 
of that makes me feel this uneasiness.
 Philosophers since antiquity have said that there is a problem of answering 
doubts about external reality. If we are mystical skeptics we hold that there is 
indeed a deep problem that philosophers have been trying to get at, but “doubt” 
cannot be the right word to describe it. There are no right words to describe it, 
at least not in literal language. The deepest legacy of philosophical skepticism is 
a disturbing realization about ourselves and how we relate to the world that is 
essentially ineffable. I want to concentrate here on (3), assuming that both (1) 
and (2) are accepted.
 If we are mystical skeptics we may try to express non-literally (to whistle) what 
the ineffable revelation is that skeptical reflection engenders. Here are some 
examples:
 ——  “Ultimately each of us is alone.”
 ——   “Here I am, a creature of flesh and bone,30 thrown into31 the circle of the 
plain,32 a fugitive from the uncanniness33 that comes with the realization 
that nothing lies between me and radical deception except the bare fact 
that (as I say) I am not deceived.”
9
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 ——  “All is entirely unintelligible to me.”34
 ——   “That shape am I!”, said with respect to my imagined epistemic counterpart 
who is a brain in a vat.35
 ——  “Tell [Godot] you saw us. You did see us, didn’t you?”36
 These utterances, taken literally, are either false, nonsensical, or platitudinous. 
As such they cannot explain my epistemic uneasiness. They may nevertheless seem 
to express in some non-literal manner the distressing revelation engendered by 
reflecting on the possibility of radical deception. For example, I am fortunately 
not alone in any obvious sense. Perhaps I can be said platitudinously to be 
alone in the sense that I have only my own experiences and not anyone else’s 
experiences, but that platitude cannot be what causes my epistemic uneasiness. 
Nevertheless, when I reflect on the possibility of radical deception I may find 
myself wanting to utter, “I am alone”, as if those words somehow convey the 
revelation that distresses me.
 If we are whistling, it may be asked, why not simply whistle some more 
standard skeptical utterance, such as, “I can’t really be sure that my children 
exist”?  Epistemological reflection may initially tempt us to assert such sentences 
literally, and when we realize that this is a mistake, that we cannot assert them 
literally, it seems to invite confusion to immediately turn around and try to employ 
them non-literally. Nevertheless, mystical skeptics need not object to someone 
who wishes to do this. Nor need they object to a “contextualist” formulation 
that implies that in the context of the philosophy room skeptical utterances are 
to be taken in the spirit of poetry and metaphor.37
 The mystical skeptic’s insistence that the deepest revelation of epistemology is 
something that cannot be expressed in literal language is not likely to please many 
analytic philosophers. As I have already said I am ignoring here those philosophers 
who claim that epistemological reflection leads them to (literally) doubt the 
existence of their children. I am also ignoring those healthy-minded philosophers 
who claim that, since epistemological reflection does not lead them to doubt, 
it does not generate any epistemic uneasiness in them.  (“Healthy-mindedness” 
is another expression from Jame’s Varieties, the healthy-minded temperament 
dealing “with the more evil aspects of the universe by systematically declining to 
lay them to heart or make much of them.”38) The question that I am focused on 
is whether, if we do not doubt but do experience epistemic uneasiness, we can, 
contrary to what the mystical skeptic claims, explain this in literal language.
 A move that I would immediately dismiss as unresponsive to the question 
is to start talking about “knowledge.” The following is a stance taken by some 
philosophers:  “I believe without any doubt that there is an external reality, but 
I think that this belief does not (or may not) qualify as knowledge.”39  I think it 
is questionable whether one can coherently claim to believe something (without 
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any doubt) while claiming to (perhaps) not know it, but I will put that aside.40 
Even if the stance is coherent it cannot generate the relevant kind of epistemic 
uneasiness. The nature of this uneasiness is our puzzle, but its target is clear. The 
target of the uneasiness is whether the world exists. It is not something else, such as 
whether I know that the world exists (or whether I have reason to believe that the world 
exists). The puzzle is that I seem to be in some sense worried about whether the 
world exists although I have no doubt that the world exists. That my children 
are real people and not just figments of my experience is something of which I 
am certain to a degree than which none greater can be conceived. Nevertheless, 
when I seriously and vividly bring to my mind the metaphysical possibility of 
radical deception—when I focus on my deluded epistemic replica who exists 
as a brain-in-a-vat and is as certain as I am that he has children—I experience 
a peculiar kind of uneasiness. The puzzle is to explain why this is. Insofar as I 
have no doubt that my children exist, if I could coherently wind up claiming 
that I do not know that they exist, while retaining my certainty that they exist, 
I may possibly feel a bit intellectually deflated, or I may perhaps feel lucky and 
thankful to have a truth that I did not earn through knowledge. But none of that 
can begin to explain why I experience a kind of “melancholy and delirium” that 
forces me to stop thinking about philosophy.
 Suppose someone says: “But that’s just the problem: that I can’t doubt.  As 
one travels down the skeptical path one’s final destination must be madness rather 
than skepticism.” So what is troubling about that? A road that leads to madness 
ought not to be traveled. “But the problem is that what stops me from doubting 
is not reason, but merely that such doubts would constitute losing my mind.” 
And what is troubling about that? You may have to give up some pretensions 
about the extent to which your life is controlled by (what you call) reason. So 
what?  “No, the point is that, since it’s not reason that supports my belief in an 
external reality, maybe the whole thing is just a delusion.” Maybe the whole thing 
is just a delusion. That is the bottom line; that is the only formulation that seems 
capable of expressing in literal terms the nature of our epistemic uneasiness. 
But that bottom line is what cannot be reached, since it expresses a doubt that 
we cannot have. The sentence “Maybe the whole thing is just a delusion” is a 
peculiar form of nonsense, in that (taken literally) it is a sentence that no one 
can sincerely assert.
 It seems to me that if we keep in clear focus the distinction between “what 
might possibly have been” and “what may actually be”, and we also keep in clear 
focus the fact (as I am assuming) that we cannot possibly doubt that we are human 
beings engaged in human lives, then we must appreciate the force of the mystical 
skeptic’s claim that our epistemic uneasiness cannot be explained in literal terms.
 As regards the connection I am drawing between death and skepticism 
someone might (mockingly) raise the following question: “So, then, how many 
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different Nothings are there? Is the Nothing that Pablo confronted when facing 
death the same Nothing, or a different one than Hume confronted when facing 
the possibility of radical deception? And what about the Nothing Pascal confronted 
when he looked up at the heavens?41  Does that make three, or is it the same 
one? And let’s not forget Mrs. Moore’s diabolical vision in the cave.42  Does that 
give us a fourth one?” This interlocutor expects principles of individuation to be 
applicable within poetical-mystical discourse. What can be said, perhaps, is that 
there is a salient commonality in the utterances typically elicited by any form of 
diabolical mystical experience. But it scarcely needs saying that many people will 
find it easy to dismiss the purported revelation of the diabolical experience as 
merely a concoction of pathological pessimism and grandiosity.
 For some minds, however, the diabolical revelation will remain as insistent as 
the laws of arithmetic. In behalf of those minds Hume has given what is probably 
the deepest and most honest response to the diabolical vision: carelessness and 
inattention. This was Hume’s famous method for coping with the epistemic 
uneasiness, the “melancholy and delirium”, induced by his epistemological 
reflections. If we are mystical skeptics we regard this uneasiness as deriving, not 
from doubt, but from a diabolical vision. Carelessness and inattention may also 
be the response to the diabolical vision in the face of death, or in any other 
context. At the end of “The Wall” Pablo is virtually mad. We expect that he will 
probably recover. He will try to resume some form of ordinary life by ignoring 
what he seemed to see when he faced death. But he may never be quite the same. 
Perhaps he can never again be a “serious person.” There may be a kind of irony to 
his step, a sense that he is not quite of this world. His irony would not derive, as 
does Thomas Nagel’s in “The Absurd”, from a conflict between two intelligible 
perspectives, the inner (subjective) perspective and the outer (objective) one. 
It would derive from a conflict between the intelligible and the unintelligible, 
between his awareness of the circle of the plain within which he must live his 
life and his peripheral sense of something incomprehensibly outside the plain 
that undermines everything in his life.43
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